

























SPECIAL SECTION: THREATS AS TORTURE: LEGAL AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES
Abstract 
Background: International law prohibits threats 
made by state officials when amounting to 
torture or other forms of ill-treatment (hereaf-
ter “ill-treatment”). Yet, there remains a press-
ing need to better distinguish in practice the 
threatening acts which amount to torture or ill-
treatment (and as prohibited) from acts which 
fall short. Responding to this need, this article 
reviews the literature and offers a discussion 
towards functionally conceptualising and, in turn, 
qualifying threats as torture or ill-treatment. 
Method: Following a systematic full-text 
search of databases with the relevant English-
language keywords, journal articles, NGO 
reports, case-law and UN documents were 
selected based on their relevance for concep-
tual, evidentiary and legal critique of threats-
as-torture. 
Discussion: Prevailing legal reasoning around 
threats-as-torture centres on the words “real, 
credible and immediate”, with inadequate ex-
plication as to their application. To this end, 
this article proposes that an assessment of the 
perception of practice and proximity of state au-
thorities to harm could be used to help qualify 
threats as “real, credible and immediate” and 
therefore torturous.
Keywords: fear, threats, coercive interrogation, 
duress, psychological torture.
I. Rationale and purpose
The prevalence of threats has been docu-
mented in a number of jurisdictions including, 
to name but two, Turkey and Israel-Palestine 
(see TIHV, 2019, p. 45; PCATI, 2019: 61% 
survivors reported use of threats). In some 
studies with torture survivors, credible and 
immediate threats have been considered a 
distinctly harmful method of torture, espe-
cially when they involved threats to relatives 
(see e.g. Argituz et al, 2014). Threats have 
been associated with severe mental suffering, 
Perception, practice and proximity.
Qualifying threats as psychological torture in 
international law
Ergün Cakal1
Key points of interest 
• International law prohibits threats 
made by state officials when amount-
ing to torture or ill-treatment. 
• What remains problematic, however, 
is how they are qualified as torture or 
ill-treatment in criminal justice and 
other processes. 
• Appraising the victim’s perception of 
practice and proximity of state author-
ities to harm helps qualify threats as 
“real, credible and immediate”. 
1)  Legal Advisor, DIGNITY - Danish Institute  
Against Torture,  Copenhagen  
Correspondence to: erca@dignity.dk
https://doi.org/10.7146/torture.v31i1.118633
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psychiatric sequel (see Baldwin et al, 2014; 
Başoğlu, 2009; Reyes, 2008), and chronic 
pain and other somatic symptoms (see Olsen 
et al, 2006; Punamäki et al, 2010). In an oft-
cited study, Başoğlu et al found that the “[f]
ear of threat to safety and loss of control over 
life appeared to be the most important medi-
ating factors in PTSD and depression” (2005, 
p. 580).
Notwithstanding this, there exists a 
considerable degree of ambiguity with respect to 
the harm (also referred to as “mental anguish” 
in shorthand) required to bring a threatening 
act within the ambit of the prohibition against 
torture or ill-treatment, beyond the fear and 
stress inherent in and therefore seemingly 
acceptable to criminal justice practice (e.g. 
policing and imprisonment). That is to say 
that threats are often difficult to legally assess 
and qualify, being disguised under standard 
operating procedures as legitimate use of force. 
States have been reluctant to prohibit what they 
characterise and minimise as mere “certain 
verbal and non-physical techniques” (House 
of Commons) or “non-violent psychological 
pressure through a vigorous and extensive 
interrogation” (Landau Commission). Courts 
are also known to legitimise such practices 
as they are “typically very protective of the 
police and the integrity of the establishment” 
(Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 617). This is particularly 
seen, as the Council of Europe’s Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has 
noted, in any “criminal justice system which 
places a premium on confession evidence [as 
it] creates incentives … to use physical and 
psychological coercion” (2002, §35). The need 
for clarification and explication, therefore, is 
patently pressing. 
The salience of this pursuit is amplified in 
light of contemporary struggles particularly 
against coercive interrogation that have the 
propensity to amount to torture and ill-
treatment. Indeed, in making a convincing case 
for a protocol on non-coercive interviewing, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
(UNSRT) at the time Juan Mendez pointed 
out that, depending on their “degree, severity, 
chronicity and type, undue psychological 
pressure and manipulative practices” may 
amount to ill-treatment (2016, §44). The 
ensuing effort has been to formulate guidelines 
outlining good interviewing practices but, 
significantly, not the redlines or functional 
criteria demarcating the coercive from non-
coercive. This is also very much a need the 
subsequent UNSRT (2020, §38) identifies 
in pointing to the “practical importance of 
continuing to clarify the fault lines between 
lawful non-coercive investigative techniques 
and prohibited coercive interrogation”.1 
This article focuses primarily on 
interrogational contexts, and secondarily 
draws on cases involving non-custodial 
settings. Whilst threats aimed at extracting 
confessions and information remain the focus, 
threats for other purposes such as intimidation, 
punishment and discrimination are also 
discussed where relevant. My aim is twofold: 
to outline the current jurisprudence on threats 
via a literature review and to elaborate and 
explicate a new conceptual approach to help 
qualify threats, particularly those which are 
subtle and tacit, as torture or ill-treatment. 
This article takes a first step in identifying 
the factors relevant to considering such covert 
threats as torture.
Part II locates existing literature which 
define and categorise threats – illustrating 
and invoking acts considered relevant to the 
discussion. Part III enumerates the normative 
1 Needless to say, this has been a long-standing 
issue (see also UNSRT, 2001, §7, urging states to 
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prescriptions which squarely and specifically 
prohibit threats which amount to torture or 
ill-treatment under international law, before 
offering a review of the relevant case-law. Part 
IV details concepts upon which legal assess-
ments and qualifications are – or should be 
– made. Part V problematises the judicial rea-
soning and formulations in the uses of “real”, 
“credible” and “immediate”, articulating them 
through the three notions of perception, prac-
tice and proximity.
II. Definition and categorisation
The idea of anticipated harm propelled for a 
coercive end is at the centre of the definition 
of “threat”: e.g. “a threat of harm made to 
compel a person to do something against his 
or her will or judgement” (Black’s Law Dic-
tionary, p. 542, 8th Edition, 2004) or “dec-
laration of an intention to punish or hurt … 
a menace of bodily hurt or injury, such as 
may restrain a person’s freedom of action” 
(OED, 1990). In the absence of coherent and 
universal distinctions between the notions 
of “threat”, “fear”, “coercion”, “intimida-
tion”, “distress”, “duress” and “anguish”, 
this article treats them as near-synonymous 
as does the surveyed literature, except where 
specified. 
There is no universally accepted legal defi-
nition of a threat or an authoritative list of 
what constitutes a fear-inducing method which 
violate the prohibition of torture and ill-treat-
ment. A survey of the jurisprudence reveals 
that threats are “neither definitively nor consis-
tently defined” (Guiora, 2008b, p. 88). Guiora 
ventures one definition of threats as entailing 
“interrogation methods inducing a suspect to 
provide his interrogator(s) with information 
when under the impression that to do oth-
erwise will result in penalty either to himself 
or to others” (2008a, p. 414). Argituz et al 
propose another definition as the “advance 
notice of harm that is going to be brought 
about if the detainee’s actions do not go in 
the direction desired by the questioner” (2014, 
p. 77). 
The category of “fear-producing actions” 
in Pérez-Sales’ Torturing Environment Scale 
is instructive in illustrating the types of acts 
at issue here, as follows: a. hopes and expec-
tations; b. threats to the person (e.g. endless 
isolation, endless interrogation, rape, pain, 
torture, death); c. threats against family or rel-
atives (next-of-kin) (e.g. rape, detention, pun-
ishment, retaliation), or threats against other 
detainees); d. anguish associated with lack of 
information (e.g. relatives of people detained/
disappeared); e. experiences of near death 
(e.g. mock executions, dry/wet asphyxia); f. 
witnessing others’ torture or death; g. use of 
situations evoking insurmountable fear (e.g. 
phobias, total darkness); h. other situations 
provoking fear or terror (2017, p. 360). More-
over, Ojeda also formulates a similar categori-
sation as: threats to self or to other; threats of 
death, physical torture or rendition; mock ex-
ecutions; forced witnessing of torture (visually 
or aurally) (2008, p. 3). 
There is significant overlap in references 
to notions of threatening and fear-inducing 
methods. For instance, the Istanbul Protocol 
recognises threats, in its multitude of der-
ivations, as a method of torture including: 
i. “threats of death, harm to family, further 
torture, imprisonment, mock executions”; 
and, ii. “threats of attack by animals, such 
as dogs, cats, rats or scorpions” (OHCHR, 
1999, §145 o-p). Recognised visually-oriented 
threats extend to displaying torture equipment 
and dangerous objects or animals (see Reyes, 
2007, pp. 604-605) and the mere presence 
of “wooden sticks, broom handles, baseball 
bats, metal rods” etc. (CPT, 2002, §39; see 
also ACHPR, Elgak and Ors v. Sudan; ECCC, 
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III. Legal anchoring: a review of 
prohibitions and case-law
This section canvasses and draws upon 
sources of law with varying degrees of au-
thority and scope. I merely seek to reproduce 
salient points in the law and literature, without 
detailed comment as to weight or priority. 
Prohibitions
Despite the definitional ambiguities, co-
ercive and threatening acts by officials are 
widely recognised to invoke the prohibition 
of torture and ill-treatment. Remaining alert 
to the “problems posed in respect of securing 
evidence of non-physical forms of torture”, 
the UNSRT mandate has consistently held 
that “fear of physical torture may itself consti-
tute mental torture” as: “serious and credible 
threats, including death threats, to the physi-
cal integrity of the victim or a third person 
… especially when the victim remains in the 
hands of law enforcement officials” (UNSRT, 
2001, §§7-8 and 3; see also UNSRT, 1986, 
§119; UNSRT, 1998, §208). The UN Com-
mittee Against Torture (CAT) has also con-
sistently found threats as amounting torture 
and ill-treatment (2008a, §7; 2006, §24; 2003, 
§§143-144). 
Furthermore, Principle 21 of the UN Body 
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 
(UNGA, 1988) prohibits (1) taking “undue 
advantage of the situation of a detained or im-
prisoned person for the purpose of compelling 
him to confess, to incriminate himself other-
wise or to testify against any other person”, 
and (2), “threats or methods of interrogation 
which impair his capacity of decision or his 
judgement” during interrogation.
Similar prohibitions also emanate from in-
ternational criminal law and international hu-
manitarian law. Notably, article 55 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court pro-
hibits “any form of coercion, duress or threat” 
during investigations. Moreover, Geneva Con-
ventions, at several points, prohibit prisoners of 
wars from being subjected to threats, coercion 
or insults during and outside of interrogations. 
Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention, for 
instance, states that: “[p]risoners of war who 
refuse to answer may not be threatened, in-
sulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvan-
tageous treatment of any kind.” Article 4 of 
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions prohibits “(a) violence to the life, health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons, 
in particular murder as well as cruel treat-
ment such as torture, mutilation or any form 
of corporal punishment ... (and) (h) threats to 
commit any of the foregoing acts.” Further-
more, ICRC Commentary to the Additional Pro-
tocols provide that “[i]n practice threats may 
in themselves constitute a formidable means 
of pressure and undercut the other prohibi-
tions. The use of threats will generally consti-
tute violence to mental well-being within the 
meaning of subparagraph (a)” (ICRC, 1987, 
§4543. p. 1376).
In sum, the prohibition of threats under 
international law amounting to torture and 
ill-treatment is clear. 
Case-law
This clarity quickly dissipates upon even 
a cursory reading of the case-law. There is 
a gap between these prohibitions and case 
law, which the existing scholarship doesn’t 
address. Taking it as a given, I do not seek 
to explain the existence of this gap. Instead, 
what I will try to do is to explicate an ap-
proach in applying the prohibitions on threats. 
There are some examples of threats such as 
mock executions which would more clearly 
fall afoul of the prohibitions. In most other 
instances, particularly with less overt threats, 
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impact and gravity. Taking stock of the com-
plexities posed by interrogational stressors, 
the element of severity remains central and 
problematically significant. What will be seen 
is that the law equates severity of harm with 
the appraisal of threats, subjectively and ob-
jectively.
I have also chosen not to dwell on dis-
tinguishing between threats as torture from 
ill-treatment – as both are prohibited. It suf-
fices to say that, as with Mendez and Nicolescu 
(2017, p. 244), I presume that intentionality 
is broader than solely the deliberate as it can 
also be satisfied by recklessness (though not 
negligence). The case-law cited below posits 
that intentionally or recklessly deploying fear 
to create a threatening situation against the in-
dividual, either directly (explicit threats) or in-
directly (“atmosphere of terror”), falls afoul of 
the prohibition of torture. This may not be so 
readily presumed in non-interrogational and 
non-custodial settings – where the purpose 
and intent may not be as patent. 
Due to its relatively extensive life-span 
and case-law, I will primarily consider cases 
from European jurisprudence which are con-
ducive for both mentioned purposes (i.e. 
outlining the jurisprudence and indicating 
a conceptual framework). To start chrono-
logically, the Greek Case is arguably the first 
international case which identified non-phys-
ical torture to include: “mock executions 
and threats of death, various humiliating acts 
and threats of reprisals against a detainee’s 
family” (ECommHR, §186). The European 
Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the Euro-
pean Court”) further articulated its position 
on threats in Campbell and Cosans v. United 
Kingdom where it found that “provided it is 
sufficiently real and immediate, a mere threat 
of conduct prohibited by Article 3 may itself 
be in conflict with that provision. Thus, it es-
tablished the rule that to threaten an individual 
with torture might in some circumstances con-
stitute at least ‘inhuman treatment’” (§26, as 
followed in El Masri v Macedonia (where appli-
cant was threatened with a gun), §§ 202-204; 
Husayn (Zubaydah) v Poland, §501 (where the 
applicant was threatened with ill-treatment)). 
Gäfgen v. Germany somewhat advanced the 
discussion. There, the European Court ren-
dered torture “the real and immediate threats 
of deliberate and imminent ill-treatment … 
[as having caused] considerable fear, anguish 
and mental suffering” (§103), and considered 
it noteworthy that the threat “was not a spon-
taneous act but was premeditated and calcu-
lated in a deliberate and intentional manner” 
(§104). Furthermore, the state of “particular 
vulnerability and constraint” (the applicant 
was handcuffed in the interrogation room) 
and the “atmosphere of heightened tension 
and emotions” (the police were under pres-
sure to locate the whereabouts of a kidnapped 
child) (§106) in which the threat took place 
was also an explicit factor in the Court’s as-
sessment (see §§80-81). The Court ultimately 
prescribed that whether any threat of physical 
torture amounted to psychological ill-treat-
ment depended on the individual circum-
stances of a case primarily “the severity of 
the pressure exerted and the intensity of the 
mental suffering caused” (§108). 
The requirement of real danger also 
emerges as a central criterion when survey-
ing Inter-American jurisprudence, where “real 
danger of physical harm” is held to amount to 
psychological torture (Baldeón-García v. Peru, 
§119, citing Maritza Urrutia; Cantoral-Bena-
vides). In Tibi v. Ecuador, for instance, the In-
ter-American Court recognized that “threats 
and the real danger of subjecting a person to 
physical injury, under certain circumstances, 
cause such a moral anguish that they may be 
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Several points discerned from the review 
can be readily summed up without necessi-
tating elaboration. Firstly, there has been no 
explicit judicial reasoning speaking to any 
qualitative hierarchy between the verbal and 
non-verbal, the explicit and implicit. Secondly, 
the following categories (inexhaustive, overlap-
ping) of threats have been found to violate the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment: threats 
to life (including non-verbal threats such as 
display of torture implements and mock ex-
ecutions); threats to inflict violence; threats 
to family members; and, witnessing the tor-
tured, the executed and the enforced disap-
peared. Additional cases will be relied upon 
in the following sections.
These cited cases involve explicitly serious 
threats to a person. Critically missing in the 
jurisprudence is what and how threats falls 
short of “sufficiently real and immediate”. 
The question thus becomes how we should 
interpret the qualifying criteria we are col-
lecting in the foregoing jurisprudence (“real”, 
“severe”, “immediate”, “credible”, “premedi-
tated”, “imminent”, “particular vulnerability”, 
“constraint”). A functional appraisal is appro-
priate here. For severity, we must naturally 
turn to the psychological impact of threats; for 
immediacy, we may well ask: “how imminent?” 
There is also a seemingly objective question 
about measuring credibility – that there are 
substantiated grounds that the communicated 
threat will be acted upon, e.g. previous or per-
sonal (witnessing) knowledge of the perpe-
trator’s ill-treatment or impropriety. In sum, 
judicial reasonings become underpinned by a 
language of risk appraisal. 
What is essentially called for is an appre-
ciation of state power through the eyes of the 
individual, by assessing the likelihood that a 
threat would be acted upon. Although a ques-
tion with clearly different legal parameters, the 
UN Committee Against Torture has adopted a 
similar approach in guiding their assessments 
under article 3 (non-refoulement) of whether 
the risk of torture upon deportation – in a third 
country – is “foreseeable, personal, present 
and real” (CAT, 2017b, §11). The language 
of risk appraisal will be returned to in Part V. 
IV. Contextual considerations: legality, 
vulnerability and totality
As with all psychological methods of torture, 
threats are difficult to identify due to over-
arching conceptual and evidentiary com-
plexities (see Cakal, 2018; 2019) due to not 
leaving physical marks, being trivialised by 
state authorities, and being combined with 
other methods (see, e.g., CAT, Martínez v. 
Mexico; CAT, S.S.B v. Denmark). Here, the 
considerations of legality, vulnerability and to-
tality are employed to assist in contextually 
situating the use of threats, explicating and 
contesting what is obfuscated as “standard 
operating procedure” and underappreciated 
as “mild” force. 
Legality 
The spectrum of harm is broader than the 
gruesome instances illustrated by the case-
law – which are arguably easier to assess as 
unjustified uses of state power – whereas those 
conceived to be tacit, mundane and everyday 
become difficult to assess and qualify as being 
harmful. To put this another way, while uses 
of minimal discomfort have been argued as 
remaining legitimate (as law enforcement 
institutions inevitably instil some degree of 
fear and anxiety), accusatorial, protracted or 
suggestive interviews overlaid with implicit or 
explicit threats are problematic. Discussed at 
length elsewhere (Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 328), 
the contestation between discomfort and 
pain, worry and fear become central here.
It should be accepted that the state takes 
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the individual (Guiora, 2008b, pp. 88-89). 
This necessitates a certain determination of 
the “baseline” or “inherent inequality” of the 
interrogation process and, in turn, “whether 
an interrogator’s actions increased this inher-
ently threatening situation to impose undue 
force on the individual to confess” (Guiora, 
2008a, p. 414). 
Advancing a more categorical argument, 
Ginbar observes that “international law does 
not recognize ‘coercive interrogation’ that is 
lawful or justifiable” (p. 277). He couples the 
prohibition against “physical or moral coer-
cion … in particular to obtain information” 
as found in Geneva Convention IV (§§ 5, 27, 
32, 37) with UN Body of Principles’ edict to 
interpret ill-treatment in a manner to “extend 
the widest possible protection” to argue that 
any form of coercion amounts to ill-treatment 
(p. 277).
Yet, not all fear arising out of criminal 
justice practice is legally unjustified, partic-
ularly that which is implicit in custodial and 
interrogational settings. The level of fear ac-
ceptably “inherent” becomes a central question 
here. This discussion also invokes the require-
ment, a creation of the European Court, that 
any allegation of torture or ill-treatment first 
satisfy a minimum level of severity to violate 
the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment. 
The Court has interpreted this in various ways 
as an experience other than “difficult” or “un-
doubtedly unpleasant or even irksome” (Guz-
zardi v. Italy, §107). 
Also apposite here is the progressive prin-
ciple from Selmouni v. France which “consid-
ers that certain acts which were classified in 
the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ 
as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified dif-
ferently in future” corresponding to prevail-
ing, increasing social standards with respect to 
human rights protection (§101). This may well 
see certain acts falling short of the minimum 
level today prohibited over time. Ultimately, 
ostensibly objective assessments must be strictly 
checked against the subjective, erring on the 
side of the latter, even if we are to risk “mean-
ingless” saturation (see, e.g. dissenting opinion 
in Bouyid v. Belgium).
It is important to bear in mind that this 
article overlooks, due to space, the distinction 
between acts are prohibited as amounting to 
impropriety or non-compliance with proce-
dural rules and acts prohibited as amounting 
to torture and ill-treatment – except perhaps 
to point out that impropriety could be an in-
dicator that harm is also present. The absence 
of essential safeguards in custody, particularly 
the access to a lawyer, health professional and 
the right to notify a third party, are important 
in this assessment. Conversely, the UNSRT 
has also stated that there is no simple one-
to-one equation here, arguing that the length, 
prolonged delay or indefiniteness of deten-
tion, albeit central and harmful, does not alone 
amount to ill-treatment (UNSRT, 2012, §47). 
I return to this point below in the discussion 
on proximity and powerlessness.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability may be approached in two dif-
ferent ways: situational and dispositional. The 
situational approach “draws attention to the 
situation of people who find themselves at 
elevated fragility or ‘risk of harm’ due to bio-
logical circumstances, situational difficulties 
or transgression” (Brown 2015, pp. 28-31). 
The dispositional accounts advance that all 
individuals are inherently vulnerable – as we 
are all dependent thus could be put under 
duress by criminal justice practice – thereby 
shifting the focus from the individual to sys-
temic characteristics. It may also be that an 
individual’s perception may be more severe 
than what we attribute to it from a position 
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An indispensable point to factor in is that no 
one reacts identically to identical treatment. A 
prominent dimension of psychological torture 
is mapping psychological vulnerabilities of a 
human being in personalizing the treatment or 
punishment. One way is the use of elements 
of personal identity (e.g. gender, age, culture, 
religion) against the person; another is the use 
of cultural and religious elements to produce 
mental suffering. Certain acts in and of them-
selves may be viewed as harmless when di-
vorced from the symbolism, connotations 
and meaning attributed by the victim (e.g. 
the taboo of nakedness, forceful breaking of 
religious obligations or rules linked to dressing, 
food or practices).
The legal assessment of the minimum 
level of severity – not just limited to 
psychological torture – also “depends on all 
the circumstances of the case, such as the 
duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, 
age and state of health of the victim” and that 
context must be taken into account, including 
an “atmosphere of heightened tension and 
emotions,” also drawing in context and totality 
of conditions and treatment (Bouyid v Belgium, 
§86).2 Leaning on such a more embodied 
and embedded approach to vulnerability 
would help correct the underestimation of 
the impact inherently stressful environments 
inflict on particular individuals (Dehaghani, 
2020). I will return to this in the discussion 
on perception.
2 Soering v. the United Kingdom is a similar point 
of reference here where the Court had particular 
regard to documented conditions of death row, 
the personal circumstances of the applicant, 
especially his age and mental state at the time of 
the offence (§111).
Totality
The analysis of torture methods should not 
obscure the fact that in many cases it is not a 
question of the application of isolated methods 
of torture, but of the combination or sequen-
tial accumulation of methods. It must also be 
born in mind that there is a fluid continuum 
between torturous acts and methods and con-
ditions and context. That is to say that it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between the stressors part 
of the background environment and actions 
that are readily identifiable in the foreground 
as distinct torture techniques. Coercion is 
profoundly difficult to accurately measure as 
it depends on a matrix of factors, physical, 
cultural, linguistic and individual. Pérez-Sales 
holds that the “presence or absence of torture 
is defined not by technique, but by the context 
and the way in which techniques are applied” 
(2017b, p. 8). His Torturing Environment 
Scale emphasises both the specific and cu-
mulative nature of detention conditions to 
counter this problem (Pérez-Sales, 2017). 
There also seem to be relatively numer-
ous documented cases of ill-treatment where 
threats are singularly considered, making it 
seem relatively easier to isolate them, at least 
jurisprudentially (see, e.g., ECHR, Gäfgen v. 
Germany). This is an illusion, however; context 
is inescapable. That is to say, whilst threats are 
said to be torturous on their own as a rule of 
thumb, it is clear from cases following Gäfgen 
that contextual factors predominate in judi-
cial assessments of torture or ill-treatment. 
Cases following Gäfgen have not expanded 
upon threats though some have emphasised 
the importance of contextual factors (e.g. an 
“atmosphere of heightened tension and emo-
tions”, Bouyid v. Belgium, §86; Al-Masri, for 
instance, did not elaborate at all). 
There have been similar rulings seemingly 
indicating the sufficiency of certain threats on 
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where the threat of rape on its own consti-
tuted an assault; Prosecutor v. Simić, 2003, 
§723: where an unloaded gun was pressed 
to the heads of interrogees and pulled, the 
“psychological burden on the detainees was 
immense”). The preponderance of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) jurisprudence, however, 
has also relied on a notion of “atmosphere 
of terror”, which in Delalic denoted a fear in 
all persons subjected to a regime. There, the 
ICTY ruled:
It is clear that, by their exposure to these 
conditions, the detainees were compelled 
to live with the ever-present fear of being 
killed or subjected to physical abuse. This 
psychological terror was compounded by 
the fact that many of the detainees were 
selected for mistreatment in an apparently 
arbitrary manner, thereby creating an at-
mosphere of constant uncertainty. (§1087)
Conversely, in one report, the UNSRT ob-
serves that the “mere fact of detention had 
the same implication” as the threat of torture 
(2001, §7). This may, at first glance appear to 
be a potentially controversial claim that does 
not find immediate substantiation in interna-
tional law. As put earlier, not all fear arising 
out of detention gives rise to an unacceptable 
level of harm. Yet, when we frame it contex-
tually (here perhaps drawing on the absence 
of crucial safeguards and due process), the 
appraisal would become substantiated and 
grounded.
Similarly, a focus on the accumulation of 
certain psychological stressors (both context 
and methods) is merited in better understand-
ing and assessing the environmental harms at 
play informing the appraisal of a threat. That 
is, manipulation and compounding stressors in 
terms of environmental conditions and treat-
ment must also be borne in mind. Solitary 
confinement and denial of visits, for instance, 
can be used as non-verbal “softening” methods 
when coupled with coercive interviewing in-
cluding threats. The potentially powerful influ-
ence of the physical regime of confinement is 
irrefutable as it “supports and facilitates these 
pressures and the effect becomes more pro-
nounced the longer the total period of deten-
tion in police custody” (Hilgendorf & Irving, 
1981, p. 81). The surrounding circumstances 
of the arrest and custody (such as how sudden 
and violent the arrest was) and the timing of 
the interrogation (i.e. day or night) are likely 
to be instructive here to understand the mental 
and physical state of the victim (Gudjonsson, 
2003, p. 311-12). 
Başoğlu also notes this problem concern-
ing the inclination to treat specific systemic 
conditions, albeit harmful, as background 
factors “rather than as an independent force 
or factor that exacerbates the harm, or as a 
form of torturous treatment itself” (2018, p. 
140). He further finds that increasing aware-
ness of the pains and long-term harms of im-
prisonment:
may well mean that the calculus applied to 
certain forms of previously unquestioned 
“lawful” confinement must be modified 
and made more stringent. Among other 
things, this knowledge makes it much 
easier to demonstrate that certain prison 
procedures and practices were, in fact, 
“calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
senses or personality,” given what cor-
rectional officials and prison staff knew or 
should have known about the harmfulness 
of such conditions and treatment. (2018, 
p. 144)
The UNSRT (2020 §47(a)) has also re-
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stand the environment in which psychological 
stressors (including fear-inducing mechanisms 
such as direct or indirect threats) are conveyed 
and amplified – and the common aspects of 
stress and coercion which affect how a partic-
ular situation is experienced and perceived. He 
identifies the following aspects in this respect: 
security (inducing fear, phobia and anxiety); 
self-determination (domination and subjuga-
tion); dignity and identity (humiliation, breach 
of privacy and sexual integrity); environmen-
tal orientation (sensory manipulation); social 
and emotional rapport (isolation, exclusion 
and betrayal); and, communal trust (institu-
tional arbitrariness and persecution). These 
may be instructive in the complex challenge 
presented by appraisals of fear and threat.
To also more comprehensively capture 
the context in which torture is inflicted, the 
European Court has developed extensive 
jurisprudence on psychological suffering 
inflicted directly or as exacerbated by subjecting 
individuals to “permanent states of anxiety” 
(Azzolina et Autres c. Italie, §133) including 
in specific contexts such as incommunicado 
detention (Aydin v. Turkey, §84), extraordinary 
rendition and secret detention (Husayn (Abu 
Zubaydah) v. Poland, §§509-510), ill-treatment 
outside a formal place of detention and mass 
arrests accompanied by gratuitous violence 
(Azzolina et Autres c. Italie, §§133-134). The 
jurisprudence of the CAT, the Human Rights 
Committee and the Inter-American Court 
is also replete with similar findings speaking 
predominantly to “anguish and distress” or 
“great suffering and anguish”.3 
3 See, e.g., Bousroual v. Algeria,  CCPR/
C/86/D/1085/2002, §§9.8, 10; Giri v. Nepal,  
CCPR/C/101/D/1761/2008, §7.7; Kimouche 
v. Algeria, CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004, §7.7; 
Quinterrros v. Uruguay, CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, 
§14; Larez v. Venezuela, CAT/C/54/D/456/2011, 
V. Conceptual contours: towards 
qualification
The legal review in Part III implicated a 
number of factors at play in qualifying a threat 
as causing sufficient mental anguish to rise 
to the level of torture or ill-treatment: the 
content of the threat; the context in which it 
was communicated (upon the totality of the 
victim’s experiences); how it was perceived 
(believed/apprehended/appraised); how the 
victim’s perception is checked, corroborated 
and qualified. Putting these factors together 
suggests a key question: did the victim per-
ceive/believe that the state authorities were 
able, prone and close to act upon the threats 
made? This assessment would incorporate 
both an objective and a subjective aspect: that 
is, how it was perceived by the victim (sub-
jective) upon the backdrop of conditions and 
treatment, and broader context (objective). 
These inform the belief of the likelihood 
that threats would be carried out, the conse-
quences of the threat and the emotional re-
sponse of those subjected. The three lenses 
of perception, practice and proximity admittedly 
overlap and cannot be strictly delineated. They 
are offered as broad heuristic groupings cov-
ering a range of factors. Bearing this in mind, 
the following discussion will aim to locate their 
core, through selective illustrations from the 
case-law. I should repeat here that my concern 
is more in addressing instances of covert or 
more ambiguous threats rather than overt 
threats, say mock executions, that much more 
readily rise to the level of torture. Thus the 
§6.10; Ali v. Tunisia,  CAT/C/41/D/291/2006, 
§2.5; González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, §§424-440; 
Álvarez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and 
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focus becomes an exercise in explicating the 
gravity of the more tacit instances of threats.
Perception: subjective appraisal
Perception, or subjective appraisal, is ad-
vanced here as the subjective measure of 
severity of harm (namely, mental anguish). 
It centres on the individual appraisal of the 
likelihood of the threatened act being carried 
out as well as the gravity of the suffering ex-
perienced. The following aims to partly map 
out the considerations with respect to what 
informs and warps perception.
Naturally, the meaning a victim brings 
to a stressor is significant, as the appraisal 
of threat “occurs at the information-process-
ing level of analysis embodied in the brain … 
[and as such] being threatened with a handgun 
can on be psychologically traumatizing if one 
knows what a gun is” (Başoğlu, 2018, p. 190). 
Individual vulnerabilities may influence the 
perception as may the conditions. Coercion 
therefore not only stems from “external stimuli 
but also from self-induced pressures, which 
results from an individual’s interpretation of 
and chosen response to events, both real and 
imagined” (Dimitriu, 2013, p. 549). 
Accepting some variance, Başoğlu (2018) 
concludes that fear in the face of threats to 
safety is in fact universal cutting across cul-
tures and species, (p. 34) and that “threat ap-
praisal can override many other factors that 
mitigate the effects of trauma, including resil-
ience” (p. 28).  Outlining the related stresses 
involved in interrogation, Pérez-Sales also 
states that that the individual in interrogation 
usually:
feels high levels of anxiety and fear 
because of the conditions of detention 
(even if they are not harsh conditions), 
isolation (including being alone with one’s 
thoughts), lack of control and uncertainty 
about what will happen next, how long 
the situation will last and the potential 
consequences. This can clearly impair the 
subject’s ability to remember, to think 
clearly and logically, and to make proper 
decisions. Thus, the experience of interro-
gation is not a neutral encounter between 
two people, even under normal conditions. 
(2017b)
An individual’s perception may indeed 
be sufficient to deem a threat to violate the 
prohibition of torture or ill-treatment. Such 
a conclusion – at least in terms of degrading 
treatment – was drawn by the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court in Bouyid v. Belgium 
where it held that: “it may well suffice that 
the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, 
even if not in the eyes of others” (§87). The 
characteristics of the victim are as always at 
play here including, to name but a few, age 
and gender (Shaked-Schroer et al, 2015, p. 
78), social status (see Davis & O’Donohue, 
2004), ethnicity, health, lack of life experience, 
unfamiliarity with police procedures and failure 
to understand legal rights, and “cognitive skills 
(e.g. intelligence, reading ability, attentional 
deficits, memory capacity), personality (e.g. 
suggestibility, compliance, assertiveness, self-
esteem, tendency to confabulate, anxiety 
proneness), specific anxiety problems (e.g. 
claustrophobia, fear of being isolated from 
significant others, extreme fear of police dogs), 
mental illness (e.g. depressive illness, psychosis) 
and personality disorder” (Gudjonsson, 2003, 
pp. 311-312).
Ultimately, it is argued that, as with many 
legal qualifications of belief, this remains open 
to being weighed against and corroborated by 
more contextual factors, such as established 
practice and proximity – to which the discus-
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Practice: knowledge and experience of patterns 
and predisposition
The concept of practice here is defined as 
a pattern, contextually-informed and objec-
tively verifiable, showing that the authorities 
are prone or predisposed to act on threats. It 
need not necessarily be profoundly historic 
or systemic as it may be specific to a period 
of time such as a highly politicised or pres-
sured event (e.g. elections) or the aftermath 
of a violent attack (or in the case of Gäfgen a 
kidnapping where time was of the essence), 
geographical location such as a certain notori-
ous police station, or towards a member of a 
particular social group such as ethnic minori-
ties, human rights defenders etc. 
There are numerous cases in which the 
use of methods other than threats inform the 
victim’s appraisal of the threat. On the back-
drop of a “pervasive climate of fear”, in Elgak 
and Ors v. Sudan, the African Commission 
found a violation of torture and ill-treatment 
(not specified) based on a mixture of cred-
ible threats, threats of rape, cigarette burns, 
and the display of torture instruments. The 
victims there, who were human rights activ-
ists, argued that the “pervasive nature of the 
threats was both real and serious and the cir-
cumstances in which they found themselves 
were so serious that they caused them severe 
mental pain and suffering” (§76). Beyond un-
derscoring the importance of totality of treat-
ment, this case exemplifies the importance to 
the assessment of credibility on the material-
isation of threats by way of the infliction of 
physical pain.
Known or uncertain fate of third-par-
ties, related or with a similar profile, is also 
rendered significant in the jurisprudence. In 
Estrella v. Uruguay, the UN Human Rights 
Committee found that the victim was “sub-
jected to severe physical and psychological 
torture, including the threat that the author’s 
hands would be cut off by an electric saw, in 
an effort to force him to admit subversive ac-
tivities” (§8.3). At one point, the victim was 
threatened with: “we are going to do the same 
to you as Victor Jara”. Relatedly, in Mukong 
v. Cameroon, the Human Rights Committee 
found a violation of article 7 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment), 
where the victim had taken threats of death 
“seriously, as two of his opposition colleagues, 
who were detained with him, had in fact been 
tortured” (§2.5). Moreover, finding torture in 
Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, the Inter-Amer-
ican Court established that, amongst other 
methods such as hooding and sensory bom-
bardment, the victim was “shown photographs 
of individuals who showed signs of torture or 
had been killed in combat and […] was threat-
ened that she would be found by her family 
in the same way. The State agents also threat-
ened to torture her physically or to kill her or 
members of her family if she did not collab-
orate” (§85).
The fact that threats follow other violations 
are also instructive here. Illustrating this, in the 
Case of the “Street Children” (Villagran-Morales 
et al.) v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Court 
held that a person “unlawfully detained is in an 
exacerbated situation of vulnerability creating 
a real risk that his other rights, such as the right 
to humane treatment and to be treated with 
dignity will be violated” (§166). Conflating the 
verbal and the non-verbal, the case also ex-
pounded the stance that “creating a threaten-
ing situation or threatening an individual with 
torture may, at least in some circumstances, 
constitute inhuman treatment” (§165). The 
Court also required threats as needing to be 
“sufficiently real and imminent” – going on to 
rule that, for the reasons outlined, they were.
In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, the ICTY con-
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treatment for detainees to be subjected to a 
torture regime with individuals being ran-
domly selected for beatings which all others 
heard (§56) creating a “climate of fear” (§194; 
see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, §700; Prosecutor v. 
Naletilic, §394; Prosecutor v. Simić, §§731, 967). 
It may be important to note that these cases 
emanate from the concentration camp, explic-
itly dehumanising milieu common to viola-
tions of international criminal law – and serves 
to emphasise the context upon which threats 
are made.
Through these examples, we see that state 
authorities support the credibility of their 
threats in producing mental anguish through 
various means – including display of photos 
and demonstration of their knowledge, power 
and predisposition to harm – with impunity – 
as the victim is made to believe that the act 
is imminent and forthcoming. This is also 
coupled up with the proximity (or the physical 
possibility of the authorities to act to achieve 
the threatened consequences) – to which the 
discussion will now turn.
Proximity: powerlessness and constraint
Cases involving police interrogations heard 
before international courts feature distinct 
tactics that draw our attention to proximity, 
powerlessness and constraint. These are readily 
discerned in a custodial context but perhaps 
less so in the non-custodial. Subject to the vic-
tim’s perception, additional aspects are impli-
cated: the physical closeness of state officials 
essentially to the threatened target of harm 
be it the victim or their family members; the 
prospects of impunity; and, strength of legal 
protections as applied to the specific situation. 
The notion of powerlessness has been de-
ployed by commentators to capture such dy-
namics. Even in the absence of coercion, to 
quote Gudjonsson, the “interrogator is part of 
a system that gives him or her certain powers 
and controls (arrest and detention, power to 
charge, power to ask questions, control over 
the suspect’s freedom of movement and access 
to the outside world)” (p. 25). Powerlessness 
may be compounded as the individual to 
whom a threat is made is put into a dynamic 
of responsibility, or perceived “complicity”, for 
another’s suffering (see Jager v. Netherlands). 
A number of cases directly invoke phys-
ical proximity. An illustrative case is found 
in Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine where a 
couple were taken into police custody. There, 
the European Court held that the husband’s 
knowledge of his wife’s custody, as well as 
her being in an advanced stage of pregnancy, 
“must have exacerbated considerably his 
mental suffering” (§156). Similarly, in Elci v. 
Turkey, a husband and wife were brought into 
interrogation together, before being interro-
gated separately, the husband was then threat-
ened that his wife would be raped if he failed 
to confess. This was held to amount to ill-treat-
ment (for a similar case see UN Human Rights 
Committee in Khalilova v. Tajikistan).
In a non-custodial context, in Musayev and 
Others v. Russia, the European Court found it 
to be inhuman and degrading treatment for 
the victim to have witnessed the “extrajudicial 
execution of several of his relatives and neigh-
bours [before being] forced at gunpoint to lie 
on the ground, fearing for his own life” (§169). 
Similarly, in the Inter-American Court Case of 
the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, three survi-
vors of a massacre who “felt the possibility that 
they might die in those moments as well […] 
knowing that the paramilitaries could return 
at any moment” (§135). There, the Court un-
derscored the “intense psychological suffer-
ing of the survivors” and the “profound fear 
that they would be deprived of their lives in a 
violent and arbitrary manner” arising from the 
witnessing of torture and execution in finding 
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Relatedly, the “distress and anguish” en-
gendered by the uncertainty of enforced disap-
pearances coupled with a lack of an adequate 
response on behalf of the authorities have also 
drawn the ire of the European Court. El-Masri 
supports the position that enforced disappear-
ance is a contravention of article 3 as the Court 
there found that the applicant’s solitary con-
finement in the hotel “must have caused him 
emotional and psychological distress”, that 
“prolonged confinement ... left him entirely 
vulnerable” and that he “undeniably lived in 
a permanent state of anxiety owing to his un-
certainty about his fate” (§202). Similarly, the 
Inter-American Court has ruled that “it is in-
herent in human nature that all those sub-
jected to arbitrary detention, incommunicado, 
torture and forced disappearance experienced 
intense suffering, anguish, terror, and feelings 
of powerlessness and insecurity” (Goiburu et al 
v. Paraguay, §157).
Even in the absence of explicit threats, the 
power differential between the state and the 
individual remains to be of contextual impor-
tance. The European Court has recognised 
that “persons who are held in police custody 
or are even simply taken or summoned to a 
police station for an identity check or question-
ing [and] more broadly all persons under the 
control of the police or a similar authority, are 
in a situation of vulnerability” (Bouyid, §107). 
Similarly, in Magee v. the United Kingdom, (not 
finding a violation of the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment but right to a fair trial (article 
6)), the European Court observed: 
The austerity of the conditions of his 
detention and his exclusion from outside 
contact were intended to be psychologi-
cally coercive and conducive to breaking 
down any resolve he may have manifested 
at the beginning of his detention to remain 
silent. Having regard to these considera-
tions, the Court is of the opinion that 
the applicant, as a matter of procedural 
fairness, should have been given access to 
a solicitor at the initial stages of the inter-
rogation as a counterweight to the intimi-
dating atmosphere specifically devised to 
sap his will and make him confess to his 
interrogators. (§43)
Such considerations have also been closely 
examined in other jurisdictions such as the 
United States. In Oregon v. Mathiason, for in-
stance, the Oregon Supreme Court broadly 
recognised that “[a]ny interview of one sus-
pected of crime by a police officer will have 
coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the 
fact that the police officer is part of the law en-
forcement system which may ultimately cause 
the suspect to be charged with crime”. The 
US Supreme Court also followed this reason-
ing in Miranda v. Arizona where it “concluded 
that without proper safeguards the process of 
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected 
or accused of crime contains inherently com-
pelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him 
to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely” (§467). In Dickerson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court ventured that:
custodial police interrogation, by its very 
nature, isolates and pressures the indi-
vidual … that even without employing 
brutality, the ‘third degree’ or other spe-
cific stratagems, custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty 
and trades on the weakness of individuals. 
We concluded that the coercion inherent 
in custodial interrogation blurs the line 
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In sum, proximity, particularly arising 
out of spatial (i.e. location, physical context) 
and temporal (i.e. timing, duration) factors, 
informs an assessment of vulnerability and im-
minence that a threat can and will be acted 
upon. In other words, the closer one is to a 
law enforcement official, whether in custody 
or in the community, the more heightened 
one’s vulnerability as tempered by the known 
practice of the state in applying the force le-
gitimately.
Towards qualification
The following questions may assist in crys-
tallising the assessment and adjudication of 
threats in practice:
1. What were the series of events and stress-
ors present in the environment in which 
the threat was made?
 This alludes to discussions of contextualisa-
tion, totality and accumulation which were 
made above. These circumstances would also 
help in inferring purpose and intent, if not 
already explicit.  See Part IV.
2. Does the threatened act amount to torture 
or ill-treatment? 
 This is a broader assessment of the content 
of the threat, or the threatened consequences 
(i.e. serious harm being inflicted to family 
member; possibility of sexual violence; humili-
ation, etc.), and invokes the specific jurispru-
dence pertaining to the assessment of that act. 
Excluded here would be legal sanctions com-
pliant with international human rights law, 
for instance. Reference to legality of the threat-
ened outcome (e.g. a proportionate sentence 
of imprisonment through due process) may be 
instructive here. This is about the nature of 
the outcome, and not how it is made. If the 
threatened outcome does not amount to torture 
or ill-treatment, there is no need to proceed. 
See also legality in Part IV.
3. Did the victim (person to whom the threat 
was made) perceive/believe that the offi-
cial (person making the threat) was willing 
and able to act upon the threat? 
 This is a subjective assessment of the victim’s 
appraisal of the situation based on their 
understanding and knowledge of state prac-
tice, including as informed by: vulnerabilities, 
previous experience, membership of a group at 
particular risk of torture, knowledge of histori-
cal patterns, strength of procedural safeguards, 
materialisation of threats, and prospects for 
impunity. See discussion on perception and 
proximity in Part V.
4. How likely was it that the threat could or 
would be acted upon?
 This is an objective assessment of the 
particular risks (also as above historical 
patterns, facts in similar cases), access to 
person, strength of procedural safeguards, 
political or institutional pressure.
Far from being prescriptive, these ques-
tions are offered as summary and suggestion.
Conclusions
This article has considered the existing lit-
erature prohibiting, conceptualising and dif-
ferentiating various types of threatening acts, 
whether verbal, non-verbal, explicit or implicit. 
It has canvassed and drawn on different legal 
contexts to look at how threats might rise to 
the level of torture. Explicating and elaborating 
the jurisprudence, it has been argued that the 
detainee’s perception of the likelihood of the an-
nounced harm is central to any judicial assess-
ment, and could be checked against the practice 
and proximity of state authorities to harm. 
Given contextual and subjective complexities, 
rule formulation is patently fraught. Indeed, as 
there is “no one kind of interrogation” there 
can be “no singular set of rules” (David et al, 
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abstract and not easily translated into con-
crete procedural rules for the interrogator” 
(Dimitriu, 2013, p. 561). Conceptualisation, 
however, is a necessary first step. 
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Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı (Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey). (2019). Tedavi ve 
Rehabilitasyon Merkezleri Raporu 2018 
[Treatment and Rehabilitation Centres Report 
2018]. 
UN General Assembly (UNGA). (1988). Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment. A/RES/43/173.
UN General Assembly (UNGA). (1998). Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998.
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR). (1999/2004). Manual on the 
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (‘Istanbul Protocol’). HR/P/PT/8/
Rev.1
United States Supreme Court. (2000). Dickerson v. 
United States. 530 US 428.
United States Supreme Court of Oregon. (1977). 
Oregon v. Mathiason. 424 US 492.
UNSRT. (1986). Report. E/CN.4/1986/15.
UNSRT. (1998). Report. E/CN.4/1998/38. 
UNSRT. (2001). Report. A/56/156.
UNSRT. (2012). Report. A/67/279.
UNSRT. (2016). Report. A/71/298.
UNSRT. (2020). Report. A/HRC/40/59.
